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NOTES AND COMMENT
Which of the above three methods, therefore, of dealing with
the same problem, would be best suited to cope with the post war
construction program, which is bound to bring about an unprece-
dented resort to the use of contractors' bond agreements?
One may well inquire whether New York should find an advan-
tage in emulating the federal approach to the matter, since, as we
have seen, the right of the third party beneficiary may stand or fall
dependent on the attitude of the state in the matter. It is apparent
that an immediate benefit from a statute such as the federal statute
is that at all times, the parties know where they stand.
BENJAMIN F. NOLAN.
APPRAISAL OF STOCK WHERE CERTAIN STOCKHOLDERS HAVE
DISSENTED-BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALUE
While the management of a corporation is vested in its board
of directors,' there are some functions over which the directors do
not have exclusive power, and in the exercise of which the consent
of a number of stockholders must be obtained. These acts, which
require the stockholders' assent, are usually acts other than everyday
business affairs, and are often termed "extraordinary acts." 2 They
include: issuance of stock to employees, 3 voluntary sale of a corpora-
tion's property, rights, privileges and franchises, 4 making changes re-
specting shares or capital,5 merging,6 and consolidating.7
Where a corporation wishes to effect these results, a problem
arises as to those stockholders who object. In order to protect the
rights of these dissenting minority shareholders and at the same time
allow the bulk of the shareholders to take beneficial action without
being hindered by a minority,8 the Stock Corporation Law gives them
'N. Y. GEr4. CORP. LAW § 27; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119
N. E. 559, 562 (1918) (as a general rule, the stockholders cannot act in rela-
tion to the ordinary business of the corporation, nor can they control the di-
rectors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their office) ;
Pollitz v. Wabash R. R., 207 N. Y. 113, 100 N. E. 721 (1912); Beveridge v.
N. Y. E. R. R., 112 N. Y. 1, 19 N. E. 489 (1889) ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110
N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. 363 (1888).
2 Metropolitan Elevated R. R. v. Manhattan Elevated R. R., 11 Daly 373,
475 (N. Y. 1884).
3 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 14.
4N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 20.
5 N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 36.
6 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 85.
7N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 86, 91.
8 "The purpose of section 21 of the Stock Corporation Law was to protect
dissenting shareholders, and the process of appraisal was designed to meet two
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the right to object and demand payment for their shares and to have
the same appraised and paid for in the manner provided, and sub-
ject to the conditions imposed by Section 21 of the Stock Corporation
Law.' The New York Court of Appeals, in a recent case 10 involv-
ing rights of dissenting shareholders where corporations were con-
solidated, asserted that, "The remedy of appraisal and payment was
intended to afford fair and just compensation to the dissenters and
at the same time provide the method by which their objections could
be fairly composed so as to enable the consolidation to proceed." 11
It is now settled beyond doubt that the right of appraisal is ab-
solute and cannot be denied notwithstanding the fact that the share-
holder has a negligible amount of shares, which could readily be sold
on the open market, or that he is acting in bad faith, so long as there
is compliance with the conditions set forth by the legislature.' 2  In
Matter of Marcus (Macy & Co.)' 3 the court sustained the right of
the petitioner to an appraisal although she owned 50 shares of com-
mon stock out of a total of 1,656,000 common shares issued. In that
case, the preferred stockholders had the right to vote only in certain
specified instances, and the corporation proposed granting them equal
voting rights with the common shareholders. This, the corporation
evils which arose because of limitations upon the powers of majority share-
holders to bind the minority to a course of action beyond the powers of the
majority, which might well be greatly to the advantage of those engaged in a
corporate enterprise. These two evils are well stated in Matter of Timmis
(200 N. Y. 177 at 181), dealing with an analogous Statute: . . . This legis-
lation was designed to meet the evils pointed out by the courts by enabling a
majority of two-thirds to sell if they deemed it was the best policy, and at the
same time to protect the minority, if they regarded the sale as opposed to their
interests." Anderson v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N. Y.
343, 349, 350, 67 N. E. 2d 573, 576 (1946); BALLANTINF, CORPORATIONS § 298
(1946).
9 N. Y. STocK Copp. LAW § 21: "In the event that the stockholders of a
corporation have taken action pursuant to sections fourteen, twenty, thirty-six,
eighty-five, eighty-six or ninety-one and if any stockholder has objected to
such action and demanded payment for his stock as provided in section four-
teen, section twenty, subdivision nine of section thirty-eight, subdivision seven
of section eighty-five, section eighty-seven or section ninety-one, either such
stockholder or the corporation may apply upon eight days' notice to the other,
within sixty days after such demand, to the supreme court at any special term
thereof held in the judicial district in which the office of such corporation is
situated, for the appointment of three persons to appraise the value of such
stock, and the court shall appoint three such appraisers and designate the time
and place of their first meeting, with such directions in regard to their pro-
ceedings as shall be deemed proper .. "
10 Anderson v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N. Y. 343,
67 N. E. 2d 573 (1946).11 Id. at 350, 67 N. E. 2d at 576, 577.
12 "Where, as in this instance, the Legislature by precise language has cre-
ated a right and with equal precision has set forth the procedure by which
that right may be availed of, the courts may not limit or enlarge that right
or alter that procedure." Matter of Marcus (Macy & Co.), 297 N. Y. 38, 45,
74 N. E. 2d 228, 231 (1947).
13297 N. Y. 38, 74 N. E. 2d 228 (1947).
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could do; 14 but the Stock Corporation Law provides that, where
voting rights are abolished or limited, the stockholder has a right to
an appraisal. 15 It was held by the court that the petitioner was en-
titled to invoke the statutory procedure of appraisal regardless of the
fact that she had only a few shares,16 since her voting rights were
limited. In such a matter, the court has no discretion.
The right having been established, the question then arises as
to the method to be pursued in evaluating the stock. Section 21 of
the Stock Corporation Law lays down no rules for determining value.
It merely states that the court shall appoint three appraisers, and a
few generalities concerning their conduct, and also the fact that the
court may confirm, modify or reject the appraisal. In failing to set
forth standards whereby the courts and appraisers may be guided in
their task, the New York Legislature is not alone.17 This makes for
a great deal of uncertainty and difficulty, especially since the terminol-
ogy of the statutes does not clearly indicate just what the appraisers
are to look for as they proceed in their work.
It is imperative, therefore, that we look to decisional law to see
how the courts have treated this problem. Even here, we find a very
meager supply of cases. This is probably due to the fact that many
shareholders realize that it is often to their advantage to go along with
a proposed change. If they persist in their objections and they de-
sire to sell their stock, they find that they may usually do so very
easily on the open market with the possibility of realizing a better
price than they might get from an appraisal. And, of course, there
is eliminated the necessity of having to wait before getting the money
for their stock which, if they submitted to appraisal, would mean
waiting until the proceeding was concluded and then possibly court
litigation.
A leading and oft-cited case is Matter of Fulton 18 which was
a proceeding to appraise the value of 481 shares of the preferred
stock of a corporation under Section 21. All of the stockholders,
except petitioner, voted to sell and transfer the corporate assets, in-
cluding good will, to another corporation. The par value of all of
the stock was $100, and it had never sold above par. The appraisers
determined the preferred stock as being worth $238.15 per share.
They arrived at this figure by dividing the total of the surplus and
'14 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 36 (e).15N. Y. STocR: CORP. LAW §38, subd. 9(d).
16 " . . the Legislature has clearly prescribed the conditions under which
a nonconsenting stockholder may have his stock evaluated and enforce payment
therefor. We find in those conditions no legislative declaration of a minimum
percentage or value of stock which must be owned by a nonconsenting stock-
holder to qualify him to invoke the prescribed statutory procedure." Matter
of Marcus (Macy & Co.), 297 N. Y. 38, 44, 74 N. E. 2d 228, 231 (1947).
17 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 299 (1946); Lattin, Remedies of Dis-
senting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REv. 233, 243
(1931).
18257 N. Y. 487, 178 N. E. 766 (1931).
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capital stock issued, which was $1,176,957.95, by 4,942, which was
the total number of shares issued, common and preferred. The Spe-
cial Term confirmed the appraisers' report and the Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed the order. The corporation appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, in modifying the order, held that this sale did not con-
stitute a dissolution of the corporation, and that the rule for distribu-
tion of surplus between common and preferred stock upon dissolu-
tion was not applicable. 19 According to the court, "If the method
adopted by the appraisers was correct, it is quite apparent that the
respondent, by dissenting and requiring an appraisal of his stock,
thereby more than doubled the value of his stock which had never
sold for more than par." 20 It is obvious that, by utilizing the stan-
dards which the appraisers did, a greatly increased value was given
to the petitioner's stock, working an injustice upon the holders of the
remaining stock.
The court refused to propose any definite criteria for estimating
the value of stock, alleging that this must be based on equitable con-
siderations. Rigid general rules, it was felt, would be unwieldy, im-
practical, and sometimes iniquitous. The object is to see that a dis-
senting stockholder is not made to lose because of his disagreement
with the majority; and, yet, it is necessary to'protect the corporation
from having to pay fantastic sums for a dissenter's stock. The court
states that, "No rule can be laid down for determining the actual or
true value of stock of a given class except one of a very general nature
and which may, in a particular case, be inapplicable because of vary-
ing provisions contained in the charter or by-laws of the corporation
or because of the existence of a state of facts peculiar to the situation
involved in the particular case." 21
Of all the factors which are to be considered, the one upon which
the greatest reliance should be placed is market price. The utterance
of the court in the instant case is that this is what should be paid,
except where the stock lacks a fair market price, and has only a
"fictitious" one. But, as is indicated by the court, complete depen-
dence should not be placed on a market price which is unreal. It is
possible that, because of the proposed sale, the market quotations may
show an increased value, and, it not being desired that the dissenting
stockholders benefit by such enhanced value, it is said that, "Market
quotations are, therefore, to be considered only in so far as they re-
flect a reasonable basis for estimating market quotations which would
probably have continued if a sale had not been made." 22 Looking
9, "The method adopted by the appraisers was the method approved for the
appraisal of preferred stock after a dissolution of a corporation. Id. at
491, 178 N. E. at 767.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 494, 178 N. E. at 769.
22 "The appraisers should consider the elements that tend to affect market
quotations: the rate of dividends; the regularity with which they have been
paid; the management and reputation of the company; its prospects for the
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at the situation realistically, though, where the market quotations
have been artificially enhanced, a stockholder would usually rather
sell it on the open market than resort to an appraisal. But there are
instances where the directors have so managed the business that the
stock has a very much depleted market value. In such cases a dis-
senting stockholder would rather choose an appraisal in order to re-
cover the actual value of his stock. Here, there was no established
market for the petitioner's preferred stock and it was thus necessary
to determine actual value, it finally being concluded that in such case
the stockholder was entitled to an aliquot part of the capital stock
account.23 The preferred stock was found not to be entitled to share
in the surplus.
While mentioning other elements which would have some influ-
ence on the final determination, 24 the court is reluctant to state par-
ticular circumstances which may exert an influence upon the ap-
praisers. It leaves the determination as to the weight which should
be given the various factors, up to the discretion of the appraisers.
Thus, since the appraisers need not adhere to any set formula, the
outcome of an appraisal proceeding cannot be ascertained in advance
with any degree of certainty. With the wide range of discretion ex-
ercised by the appraisers, a stockholder's attempt to determine by
which method-sale on the open market or appraisal-he would re-
ceive the best possible price, would be venturing into the realm of
prognostication.
Application of Behrens,2 5 a subsequent case, again set forth the
market value as being most important. The dissent was to a pro-
posed merger. The petitioner placed great reliance on the net asset
value because of the strong financial position of the company, and
tried to minimize the market, which was considerably lower. But,
though the stock was not listed on any exchange, there was a fairly
active over-the-counter market in the preferred stock, and this had
some influence on the court's decision. The court grants that there
is a wide latitude for judgment in a proceeding such as this, but re-
marks that it must test the report of the appraisers by "legal stan-
future and all other circumstances which will aid them in estimating the future
course of the stock in the market." Id. at 493, 178 N. E. at 768.
23 "The capital stock account was made up of the amount paid for the stock
when issued at par, i.e., $494,200. That amount divided by the number of shares
issued equals the value of each share of preferred stock, the value at which it
should have been appraised under the facts in this case." Id. at 496, 178 N. E.
at 769.
24". ... the investment value of the stock which is largely determined by
the rate of return, the security afforded that the dividends will be regularly
paid, the possibility that dividends will be increased or diminished, the selling
price of stocks of like character, the amount of preferred stock in comparison
with the common stock, the size of the accumulated surplus applicable to the
payment of dividends, the record of the corporation and its prospects for the
future." Id. at 495, 178 N. E. at 769.
2561 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd w. o., 271 App. Div. 1007,
69 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (lst Dep't 1947).
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dards." Relying on the Fulton case, it states that, "While there is
no legal formula which can be enunciated or applied in valuation pro-
ceedings, the appraisal remaining a matter of judgment on the facts
in each case .... the appraisal should take account of market value,
investment value, and net asset value." 26 However, no one of these
is to be absolutely relied upon to the complete exclusion of any of
the others.
In determining the weight to be given market value, it would
receive great and probably controlling consideration if there were a
".. . wide market on an established exchange under normal condi-
tions ... ," 27 Where it did not truly and fairly reflect the judgment
of those who were actively engaged in buying and selling stock, little
weight would be accorded it. Since the appraisal contemplates a
continuance of the corporation, appraisers must not view the situa-
tion as a winding up or liquidation, so that the value of the stock and
net asset value will not always be similar. While the court hesitates
to define investment value, it seems to be the attractiveness that the
securities would have to prospective dealers of stock. The question
as to whether in the instant case the asset or liquidating value could
be accepted in view of the force of other considerations, was resolved
in the negative, the court holding that, although the market was not
such that it could be relied upon completely for valuation purposes,
yet it was apparent that ". . . those who were interested and engaged
in buying and selling the stock did not attach any value to its ap-
proaching net asset value." 28 And the conclusion was that the market
was entitled to some weight.
One of the clearest expressions of the courts' attitude toward
this problem was made by Justice Peck in the recent case of Matter
of Marcus (Macy & Co.).29 In this proceeding, to appraise peti-
tioner's stock, the dissenter served the company with a subpoena
duces tecum requiring it to produce all its books, records and working
papers and also those of its subsidiaries. She had included in the
order appointing the appraisers a provision that the appraisers should
select a certified public accountant to prepare an audit as part of the
expenses of the appraisal. The object of this was to inquire into the
value of all the underlying assets of the company and its subsidiaries,
which operated department stores in New York, New Jersey, Ohio,
Georgia and California. The issue raised was whether it was proper
to allow the petitioner a physical inventory of all the goods or whether
it was sufficient to use market value of the stock or make a valuation
261d. at 182.
27 Id. at 183.
28 Id. at 184.
29273 App. Div. 725, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (1st Dep't 1948). Matter of
Marcus, note 13 supra, concerned the question of whether petitioner had a
right to an appraisal. The instant case involved the proceeding itself, and the
objection by the corporation to some of the methods the stockholder wished
to employ in the appraisal proceeding.
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based on known factors, e.g., market value, book value, earnings,
dividends and business conditions, without an inventory and audit.
The company's motion to vacate the subpoena duces tecum was
granted and an order appointing appraisers was modified, so that the
provision for the selection of an accountant was eliminated. The
court held that in determining value, the market value controlled
where the market for stock was free and fair and that net asset value
was not the proper standard for determining the value of shares of
a going concern.
Here again the court emphasizes that the facts of each case
must be viewed separately in order to ascertain the various factors
to be considered in evaluating stock, and also the weight to be given
to each. Although it does not attempt to minimize other factors,
the court lays great stress on market value stating that it ". . . is the
controlling consideration where there is a free and open market and
the volume of transactions and conditions make the market a fair
reflection of the judgment of the buying and selling public." 30 It
observes that, wherever other factors have been given greater weight
it has been because the market was very narrow and unestablished
so that it could not be accepted as authoritative. The market, in the
instant case, was a very active one, several hundred shares being
traded every day. In a typical six-months period there were no sig-
nificant changes nor erratic fluctuations which would warrant calling
the market anything but normal. The market, having been found to
be sufficiently representative of the opinion of those interested in the
sale and purchase of the stock, the court is led to the conclusion that
it should be accorded full recognition.
The company, in accordance with accepted and sound accounting
practice, carried its fixed assets at cost and its inventories at the lower
of cost or market. The petitioner contended that, in the light of the
inflationary conditions existing at that time, the company may have
undervalued its assets, thus resulting in inaccurate market valuations,
since the corporation's statements affected, to a great extent, the
market prices of the stock. The court dismissed this contention stat-
ing that the "inflationary conditions" were common knowledge and
allowance was made for these by those most familiar with the market.
It could not be held as a matter of law that the company's valuation
of its assets in its published statements was conclusive; yet ". . . mar-
ket traders and investors were as fully and accurately informed as to
the condition of the company as is customary through financial
statements." 31 It should be noted, in support of the court's argu-
ment, that on the appraisal date, Macy stock had been selling in the
market at 60% above the book value. It is apparent from this that
the traders had made a very liberal allowance for values over and
above book values. It may very well be that asset values are in fact
30 Id. at 727, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 78.
31 Id. at 730, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 80.
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higher at a particular time than the figures at which they are carried.
Nevertheless, for stock appraisal purposes, this is relatively insig-
nificant since the stock must be appraised not as if it were a liquida-
tion proceeding, but as the stock of a going concern. Thus it would
not be necessary to produce the company's books and have an inven-
tory taken, and net asset value would be given little or no considera-
tion. Even if it were to be given some consideration, a detailed re-
valuation of assets would be unwarranted, as it does not appear that
by pursuing that course there would be any closer realization of true
value than the judgment of those who daily trade on the exchange.
The Marcus case is a very practical approach to the problem,
and is a good indication as to how far one will be allowed to go in
examining corporate books. The appraisal proceeding is to see that
the stockholder gets fair value for his stock,32 and it was not intended
to permit abuse by opening the gates to every whim and desire of the
dissenting stockholders. An appraisal proceeding should be reason-
able, and any deviation would be a subversion of the intent of the
statute. While the case does not stand for the proposition that where
stock is listed on the exchange, the exchange quotation must be the
figure used as the value of the stock; yet, if it can be shown that it
reflects the value of the stock as accurately, objectively and fairly as
possible, it should be accorded the greatest consideration. Market
quotations are only one of the factors to be considered, and the ap-
praisers will not be confined to that alone. Detailed checking of
fixed assets and inventory valuation should not be allowed unless it
can be shown that there was some wrongful manipulation of the
books, making the market value inaccurate and undependable. That
this is sound is evident. A contrary policy would most certainly be
detrimental to any semblance of order in business. A mere dissenter
could disrupt the smooth functioning of a large organization, involv-
ing it in taking numerous inventories and having its books frequently
in the hands of auditors and appraisers. Any progress attempted by
a corporation would be stymied, and it would probably refrain from
making desirable changes, when it foresees the ominous consequences.
It would also be fertile ground for what might be called "extortion",
the dissenting stockholder being able to mulct the corporation for
many times the value of his stock, with the resulting injustice to
the corporation, to the other shareholders and possibly the ultimate
consumer. The court seems to intimate that petitioner was exerting
every effort to get an exorbitant price for her interest. From a real-
istic point of view it can be seen that, by asking for $20,000 for stock
32 "The administration of an appraisal proceeding is to be kept to its statu-
tory purpose of protecting a dissenting stockholder's legitimate interests. Con-
sistent with that purpose, the legitimate interests of the company and its other
stockholders should be protected by keeping the proceedings within reasonable
bounds and avoiding all unnecessary expense and burden upon the parties."
Id. at 729, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 80.
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reasonably worth $2,000, petitioner's conduct is such that the court
was justified in doubting her motives. Out of 1,650,000 outstanding
shares, she alone, with a mere 50 shares, objected to the corporate
action and asked for an appraisal. She could have received a very
handsome sum by selling on the open market, which sum, while not
ten times the value of her stock, would nevertheless have given her
more than a reasonable return on her investment. And, while it. is
settled that the number of shares held or the good faith of the share-
holder is irrelevant, still ". . . the court is not required to blind itself
to reality and permit the proceeding to go beyond what is necessary
to award petitioner fair value for her stock and become a device for
obtaining more than fair value." 
33
While the Marcus case was decided in a very practical and
realistic manner, it could just as well have gone the other way, there
being no set channels to guide or limit the appraisers'and judges.
Though market value has been emphasized continuously throughout
the cases, a problem arises when there is no listing on an exchange
or any transactions on the open market. A question also arises
whether the courts might not take a contrary view to that taken in
the Marcus case if the dissenting stockholder owned, instead of 50
shares, 500,000 shares, or some other figure. While the controversies
arising on the subject are not many, still it appears that the legisla-
ture should set forth certain general standards which would aid im-
measurably in clarifying the situation, and it is submitted that Stock
Corporation Law, Section 21, be amended to accomplish this result.
Louis E. MATTERA.
THE STATUS OF AN AccomM,!ODATION INDORSER UNDER SECTION 29
OF THE UNIFORz, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
Since the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
in 1896 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in National
Conference and its subsequent enactment by all the states, one of its
provisions, Section 29,1 has been the subject of much criticism; 2
and the source of litigation, much of which is concentrated upon the
33 Id. at 729, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 80.
I N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 55. "An accommodation party
is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser,
without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to
some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for
value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew
him to be only an accommodation party."
2 Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARv. L. REv. 241, 242
(1900); Brannon, Some Necessary Ainendnments of the Negotiable Instrw-
meints Law, 26 HARv. L. REv. 493, 494 (1913) ; Brewster, Proposed Amend-
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